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Abstract:  Many U.S. states have regulations that prevent natural gas utility 
companies from turning off service to non-paying consumers. The goal of 
these policies, termed “no shut-off” (NSO) regulations, is to provide a 
guaranteed minimum level of residential comfort by reducing the marginal 
cost of consumption to zero for a period of time. This paper employs a 
difference-in-difference approach applied to residential U.S. Energy 
Information Administration data to evaluate whether NSO policies generate 
higher levels of gas usage. Our preferred specifications suggest that 
activation of a NSO policy increases natural gas consumption by between 4.7–
4.8%, resulting in a total increase of between 66 and 67 billion cubic feet of 
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natural gas consumed per winter season in covered states, at a value of as 
much as $950–970 million annually. 
Keywords: Natural gas usage, Utility regulation 
1. Introduction 
Nearly all U.S. states have regulations preventing utility 
companies from disconnecting customers’ natural gas (used for home 
heating). While the specifics of these regulations differ, they are 
primarily designed to prevent gas providers from ceasing service to 
non-paying customers. The goal of these policies, termed “no shut-off” 
(NSO) regulations, is to provide the less fortunate with habitable 
housing when circumstances may otherwise prevent such a 
transaction; however; NSO policies achieve this goal by artificially 
reducing the marginal cost of consuming natural gas, which may result 
in inefficient levels of consumption relative to facing full market 
prices.1 Despite nearly every state in the U.S employing some type of 
NSO regulation, there has been no previous evaluation of their effect 
on natural gas markets. This paper is the first to combine 
documentation of these policies with consumption data and examine 
the extent that residential natural gas consumption changes in the 
presence of NSO policies. 
Our estimation strategy is to use policies that are enforced 
under a date-based mandate, or that become active in a given state 
between set calendar dates, regardless of local weather conditions. We 
highlight date-based policies as a way to avoid endogeneity in 
estimation. We use two difference-in-difference type estimation 
strategies to test whether average consumption increases when a NSO 
policy is active. The first identification strategy uses two-way fixed 
effects (state and month/year) and the timing of NSO policy activation 
to measure the effects on consumption. The second uses a standard 
difference-in-difference model, estimating the effect of turning the 
policy on for the treated group during the treated time period relative 
to the baseline difference between the group of NSO states and other 
states during non-treated times. We implement both strategies 
controlling for a set of covariates (weather, prices, local median 
income, and year effects). In addition to our general model, we 
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explore parallel models for variants of NSO policies, and an alternative 
model based on a trimmed sample using a propensity score. 
Our results strongly support the idea that NSO policies lead to 
higher levels of natural gas consumption. Our preferred specifications 
suggest that activation of a NSO policy increases natural gas 
consumption by between 4.7–4.8%, resulting in a total increase of 
between 66 and 67 billion cubic feet of natural gas consumed per 
winter season in covered states, at a value of as much as $950–970 
million annually. We also find different effects across the 
heterogeneous NSO policy types that have different coverage 
requirements. In specifications that expand the set of controls to 
include region-month-year effects, we estimate NSO polices increase 
consumption by between 2.6–3.2%, for an annual increased expense 
of between $530–$650 million dollars. Surveys of natural gas 
customer accounts show that approximately 24% of customers have 
account balances that are past due, implying an increase in 
consumption among this group of as much as 24.6%. 
Our results complement estimates from Levinson and Niemann 
(2004) that demonstrate tenants living in utility-included rental 
housing (where the marginal cost of energy use is essentially zero) set 
their thermostats between 1 °F and 3 °F warmer in winter months. 
Levinson and Niemann generally find smaller magnitude increases in 
energy use than we do here, but they also point out that their work 
may provide an underestimate. Our work also represents a new 
contribution to explaining the “energy paradox”, where consumers are 
seemingly too slow to adopt conservation technology.2 If NSO policies 
are excusing customers from paying the full cost of natural gas usage, 
they have less incentive to adopt conservation technologies. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes 
NSO policies and outlines our identification strategy. Section 3 
describes our data and offers summary statistics. Section 4 presents 
results, and the final section concludes with policy discussion and 
directions for future research. 
2. NSO policies and empirical methodology 
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Regulations that govern and restrict utility companies’ ability to 
disconnect service to non-paying customers are generated at the state 
level. Specific details of NSO policies vary from state to state in both 
existence and terms, but the main components of the policies are 
consistent. Most states with such polices prevent or delay gas 
disconnection for medically-vulnerable customers year-round. In 
addition, many states have some type of seasonal or weather-based 
policy that protects customers during certain times of year or during 
extreme cold or heat. This paper focuses on protections that affect 
natural gas utilities.3 We use the term “no-shut-off policy” to refer 
specifically to seasonally implemented policies throughout the paper.4 
This paper focuses specifically on policies that are activated by 
dates, not weather events, and are in effect for certain months during 
the year, regardless of actual weather patterns. Some state NSO 
policies are triggered only by temperature; for example, in Oklahoma 
gas cannot be turned off when the actual or predicted temperature is 
below 32 °F during the day or 20 °F at night. Since temperature-based 
policies are endogenous to consumption, because consumption 
increases when temperature decreases, they do not make a good 
natural experiment to examine how customers react to these laws. 
Date-based policies, on the other hand, go into effect regardless of 
weather patterns, and promise the same protections for non-paying 
customers. 
Summary statistics from the Natural Regulatory Research 
Institute (NRRI) reveal that NSO policies potentially cover a substantial 
segment of natural gas consumers. A NRRI report from 2005 surveyed 
utility providers to determine the state of consumer accounts. The 
findings in the report show that the percentage of customers with a 
balance due 30 days or older ranged from 34.3% in California to 
9.84% in Colorado, with an average of 24% across the sample. 
Furthermore, the NRRI report finds that on average only 4.5% of 
customers have service disconnected, leaving a substantial share of 
customers that are not paying natural gas bills and still receiving 
service, and would thus be covered by the date-based NSO policies we 
examine.5 
Table 1 shows a summary of date-based state NSO Policies. 
Besides the timeframe in which the policies are effective, policies also 
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differ by state according to which group or groups of customers are 
covered by the policy. Some policies apply to all natural gas customers 
while others only protect certain subsets of customers, such as the 
elderly, the disabled, unemployed customers, those whose income is 
below a given threshold, or households qualifying for welfare 
programs. We include a sub-group analysis that examines policies with 
varying degrees of generosity. 
Table 1. No shut off policy summary. 
State 
Date 
Based 
Other Plan Type of Date Based 
Active 
Months 
AL No Temperature – – 
AR Yes Temperature Need Based Nov–March 
AZ No Temperature – – 
CA No 
Physician 
Rec 
– – 
CO No 
Physician 
Rec 
– – 
CT Yes – Need Based Nov–April 
DE Yes Temperature Covers All Nov–March 
FL No – – – 
GA Yes Temperature Payment Plan Nov–March 
IA Yes Temperature Need Based Nov–March 
ID Yes – Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–March 
IL Yes Temperature Need Based Dec–March 
IN Yes – Need Based Dec–March 
KS Yes Temperature Need Based Nov–March 
KY No – – – 
LA No – – – 
MA Yes – Need Based Nov–March 
MD Yes Temperature Vulnerable, Max Due Nov–March 
ME Yes – Need Based Nov–April 
MI Yes – Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–March 
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State 
Date 
Based 
Other Plan Type of Date Based 
Active 
Months 
MN Yes – 
Need Based, Payment 
Plan 
Oct–April 
MO Yes Temperature Need Based Nov–March 
MS Yes – Need Based Dec–March 
MT Yes Temperature Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–March 
NC Yes – Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–March 
ND No 
Payment 
Plan 
– – 
NE Yes – 
Need Based, Payment 
Plan 
Nov–March 
NH Yes – 
Vulnerable, Need Based, 
Max Due 
Nov–March 
NJ Yes – Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–March 
NM Yes – Need Based Nov–March 
NV No Temperature – – 
NY Yes – Vulnerable Nov–April 
OH Yes – Payment Plan Nov–April 
OK No Temperature – – 
OR No 
Physician 
Rec 
– – 
PA Yes – Need Based Dec–March 
RI Yes – Vulnerable, Max Due Nov–April 
SC No Temperature – – 
SD Yes 
Physician 
Rec 
Covers All Nov–March 
TN No 
Physician 
Rec 
– – 
TX No Temperature – – 
UT Yes – Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–March 
VA No 
Physician 
Rec 
– – 
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State 
Date 
Based 
Other Plan Type of Date Based 
Active 
Months 
VT Yes Temperature Vulnerable Nov–March 
WA Yes – Need Based Nov–March 
WI Yes Temperature Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–April 
WV Yes – Need Based Dec–Feb 
WY Yes Temperature Vulnerable, Need Based Nov–April 
Notes: The “other plan” column details what other types of NSO 
policies exist in a state (if any). Temperature indicates that the state 
has a temperature based no shut off policy, Physician Recommend 
indicates that it has a no shut off policy based on the medical 
recommendation of a physician, Payment Plan indicates the state has a 
no shut off policy that allows customer to be placed on a payment 
plan. 
Need Based indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
with demonstrated financial hardship, unemployment, recipients of 
government welfare, etc. 
Vulnerable indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
with illness, disability, and/or elderly or very young customers. 
Max Due indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
whose outstanding bill is under a certain dollar amount. 
Payment Plan indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
who commit to a payment plan to pay their outstanding bill. 
Covers All indicates a date based policy that covers all customers, 
regardless of characteristics. 
We do not have data on policies for Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, 
D.C., these areas are excluded from the analysis. NSO policy data are 
summarized from the following sources: Howat and Devanthary 
(2006); Harak and Wein (2008); Harak et al. (2011); LIHEAP 
Clearinghouse (2013). 
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In all, 33 states have some type of date-based NSO policy. 
Many of these states are Midwest and Northeastern states, but there 
are also several Western and Southern States that have policies. Of 
the states that have a date-based policy, the most common is a “Need 
Based” policy, or one that covers only a population that has some 
demonstrated financial hardship. Some states combine a need-based 
criterion with a “Vulnerable” criteria, which makes the NSO policy 
conditional on customer personal characteristics such as being 
disabled, ill, or elderly. Other variants of date-based policies are those 
that only cover customers who have an outstanding balance under a 
certain dollar amount (“Max Due”), or those that agree to be put on a 
payment plan (“Payment Plan”). There is also a set of states (DE and 
SD) that enforce a date-based NSO policy for all natural gas customers 
(“Covers All”). The second column also shows information on states 
that have a separate policy covering customers based on temperature 
or on the advice of a physician. 
To isolate the effect of NSO policies on natural gas consumption, 
it is necessary to separate the policy’s effect from all other factors that 
influence consumption. Any characteristics common to those states 
that have NSO policies, as well as factors common to the months in 
which the policies are active must be accounted for. There could be an 
unknown or unquantifiable factor or factors influencing consumption of 
natural gas in the states that have NSO policies. Similarly, the months 
during which policies are typically active could have more in common 
with each other than what is captured by weather variables. It is 
impossible to identify and measure all the characteristics common to 
each group of states or months, but to ignore their influence would 
certainly result in omitted-variable bias. 
We offer two estimation strategies to deal with omitted 
variables, both use the timing of NSO policies becoming active for 
certain months to identify the effect of the policy. The two strategies 
we implement are a two-way fixed effects model and a standard 
difference-in-difference model. The difference between the models is 
how they control for cross section variation and seasonal/time 
variation. The two-way fixed effects model accounts for any time-
invariant characteristics at the individual state level, while the 
standard difference-in-difference approach accounts for any time-
invariant characteristics among the group of states that choose to 
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have NSO policies. The two-way fixed effects model accounts for any 
time-varying or seasonal characteristics at the month-year level, while 
the standard difference-in-difference approach accounts for any time 
varying characteristics among the group of covered months only. 
The two-way fixed effects model is: 
(1) 
Where the dependent variable F is the statewide monthly flow of 
natural gas consumption per resident. The subscripts i, t, and m refer 
to the state, year, and month, respectively. The variable NSOActive is 
equal to one for the NSO states in the months when a policy is active, 
and zero otherwise.6 
The inclusion of state and month-year fixed effects will control 
for any permanent differences between states, and for any differences 
that are common to all states, but change with time or seasonality. 
State fixed effects, δi, are important if there are constant factors 
within each state that drive gas usage and are correlated with when 
policies become active (for example a state being situated in a 
particular part of the country). Month-year effects, γm,t, are important 
if there are constant factors across months of the season and or years 
of the data that are correlated with natural gas consumption and when 
policies become active (for example, policies generally being active 
during peak heating seasons). The coefficient of interest in Eq. (1) is 
β1, which identifies the effect of an active NSO policy on residential 
consumption of natural gas. 
To account for other factors that affect gas consumption per 
person that may vary by state and month/year, we add various control 
variables to the base model in X. Importantly, we condition our 
estimates on differences in temperature changes through the variable 
Heating Degree Days. We also condition on the residential price of 
natural gas, and the local median income of residents (in thousands). 
The Heating Degree Days variable is expected to have a positive effect 
on gas consumption, since the lower the temperature, the greater 
number of heating degree days there are, and the more gas is needed 
to heat homes. 
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As an additional guard against unobserved heterogeneity that 
may vary by time/season but be specific to particular regions, we 
estimate (1) replacing γm,t with a set of region-specific month-year 
effects, σr * γm,t. We present results with the region specific month-
year effects alongside of the standard two-way fixed effects results for 
comparison purposes. 
We also estimate a standard difference-in-difference model, 
which allows us to estimate whether average consumption of natural 
gas increases with an active NSO policy, relative to states without an 
active policy for months the policies are typically active. This model is 
a more basic version of (1), with less stringent controls for time-
invariant and time-variant effects that may be correlated with when 
NSO policies become active. The difference-in-difference model tests 
whether the difference between average consumption in states with a 
NSO policy, and average consumption in states without a policy, shifts 
when a policy becomes active. It answers the question of whether 
states with an active policy consume more gas than they would have 
without an active policy, by looking for a change in the difference in 
consumption between states with and without a policy as a group. 
The difference-in-difference specification is: 
(2) 
Where NSO State is a dummy variable equal to one if a state has an 
NSO policy and zero if it does not. Month Covered is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the calendar month is between October and April, 
inclusive, and zero otherwise.7 The model identifies all states with NSO 
policies and all months covered by NSO policies, and the interaction of 
being a NSO state during a month that is covered. NSO Active is 
similar, but not equal to, the interaction between NSO State and 
Month Covered because the months in which a policy is active differ by 
state, and Month Covered includes all months in which any state has 
an active policy. Month Covered controls for characteristics common to 
the months in which no-shut-off policies are active, but is only a 
coarse replacement for the month-year effects in (1). The coefficient 
of interest is β3, which tells us the marginal effect of activating an NSO 
policy on monthly gas usage. All control variables in this model are the 
same as the state fixed-effects model, and the model identifies the 
effect of the NSO policies when they become active within a given 
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state during the month specified by law. We also estimate a version of 
(2) that replaces Month Covered with a month-year fixed effect. We 
cluster all standard errors in both specifications at the state level. 
2.1. Policy heterogeneity 
In addition to estimating (1) and (2) to determine the general 
effects of NSO policies, examining variations in the specific rules of the 
policies may show what aspects of the policies matter most for moral 
hazard. Most NSO policies only apply to certain subsets of customers, 
such as the medically vulnerable or those with financial hardship. To 
determine the different impact of the various policy types, k, we 
estimate the following two-way fixed effect and difference-in-
difference specifications: 
(3) 
and 
(4) 
Where the k different policy types are described in Table 1. We 
separately estimate the effect of Need Based, Vulnerable, Payment 
Plan, and Covers All policies. We do not separately estimate for the 
Max Due category, as it is never mutually exclusive for a state, but 
note that it is tied to other policies in some states, and we cannot rule 
out the effect of Max Due policies from other categories. These 
regressions use states with other NSO policies as the reference group, 
so the interpretation is the marginal effect of altering the NSO policy 
relative to the average of all other NSO policies. 
3. Data 
The data on no shut-off policies come from the National 
Consumer Law Center (NCLC) and the Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program (LIHEAP). The NCLC published summary tables of 
extreme weather protection rules in 2008 and 2011, while LIHEAP 
maintains a current list of no-shut-off policies and provided such a 
table for a study published in 2006.8 Together, these tables provide 
policy data for the 48 contiguous United States from the beginning of 
2006 through February of 2013. To fill in the missing years for which 
there are no summary tables, we make the following assumptions. If a 
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policy does not change in two subsequent tables, it is assumed that 
the policy does not change over that period. For example, if a state 
has the same policy in 2011 as it did in 2008, we assume that the 
same policy was also in place in 2009 and 2010. Since there are very 
few differences among the summary tables, this assumption seems 
reasonable. Where differences do occur among the tables, state 
regulations and utility company documents are assembled to pinpoint 
the nature and effective date of the policy change. Although there are 
several differences between the tables, most of these are due to 
different methods of recording the policies rather than actual 
substantive changes to the policies. There are no substantial changes 
in the date-based cold weather protections between 2006 and 2013. 
The dependent variable, natural gas flow per resident, is the 
total statewide monthly gas consumption by residential consumers 
divided by the state population. Natural gas flow data are obtained 
from the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) and 
are measured in millions of cubic feet. The American Gas Association 
estimates that an average American house consumes 250 cubic feet of 
gas per winter day. State level population data is gathered from the 
census, and linearly interpolated between annual estimates to apply 
monthly. 
Weather is the single most important driver of natural gas 
consumption, and it is also the most important factor determining 
when non-date-based NSO policies are active. Heating degree days 
measures the monthly sum of how many degrees the average daily 
temperature is below 65°. For example, if the average temperature is 
35 °F one day (30° below 65°), and 60 °F the next day (5° below 
65°), the total heating degree days for these two days is 35. Heating 
degree days are preferable to average monthly temperature because 
they capture the variance of temperatures within each state-month, 
rather than just the mean temperature. All heating degree day data 
(measured in degrees Fahrenheit) are obtained from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which is part of the United 
States Department of Commerce. 
Natural gas prices vary by state and time of year and affect 
consumption, so we include them as a control variable. The price data 
are obtained from the EIA, the same source as the natural gas flow 
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data. The EIA data are given in nominal dollars per thousand cubic feet 
of gas.9 We also use median income as a control variable to account 
for time trends and potential seasonal adjustment to consumer 
incomes that may coincide with policy activation.10 
4. Results 
Our primary results, shown in Tables 2 and 3 reveal that 
activating an NSO policy has a large, positive, and statistically 
significant effect on natural gas consumption across both state fixed 
effects and difference-in-difference models. These effects remain 
strong in the presence of estimating with control variables and adding 
year effects to the model. The magnitude of the NSO policy effect 
depends on the method and specification employed, with extremely 
large estimates in specifications that do not control for local weather 
conditions, and more modest estimates in specifications that control 
for weather. 
4.1. State fixed-effects results 
Table 2 shows the results for estimating Eq. (1), using a variety 
of control variables. These results show that an active NSO policy has 
a large, positive, and statistically significant effect on natural gas 
consumption. The largest estimates, those without controls for Heating 
Degree Days, show that activation of an NSO policy causes a 10.9–
19% increase in natural gas use. The magnitude of results that do not 
control for weather demonstrate omitted variable bias, as Heating 
Degree Days certainly contribute to natural gas usage, and is also 
likely correlated with when NSO policies become active. We take these 
results as a caution on the importance of controlling for weather, even 
when using date-based policy implementation to identify the effects of 
NSO policies on consumption. 
Table 2. Natural gas consumption and NSO Policies: two-way FE 
estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NSO Active 
0.19
0*** 
0.04
8*** 
0.047*
** 
0.047*
** 
0.10
9*** 
0.03
2*** 
0.026*
** 
0.026*
** 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(0.01
3) 
(0.01
3) 
(0.01
1) 
(0.01
1) 
(0.01
2) 
(0.01
1) 
(0.01
0) 
(0.01
0) 
Heating Degree 
Days 
 0.00
1*** 
0.001*
** 
0.001*
** 
 0.00
1*** 
0.001*
** 
0.001*
** 
 (0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
 (0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
Retail Price 
  −0.05
3*** 
−0.05
3*** 
  −0.04
1*** 
−0.04
1*** 
  (0.00
1) 
(0.00
1) 
  (0.00
1) 
(0.00
1) 
Median Income 
(thousands) 
   −0.00
1 
   0.002 
   (0.00
2) 
   (0.00
1) 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-Year 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Region × Mont
h × Year 
Effects 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128 
R-Squared 
0.96
2 
0.96
8 
0.976 0.976 
0.97
7 
0.98
2 
0.985 0.985 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of 
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita. 
NSO Active represents the interaction between a state with an NSO 
policy and a month when the policy is active for date-based NSO 
policies only. Months that are partially covered by NSO policies are 
considered fully covered in the data. The unit of observation is a state-
month. Standard errors clustered at State level are shown in 
parentheses. 
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*** 
p < 0.01. 
Controlling for Heating Degree Days reduces the magnitude of 
the results considerably. In the base two-way fixed effects 
specifications that control for Heating Degree Days, our estimates 
suggest that activation of an NSO policy increases natural gas 
consumption by between 4.7–4.8%. These results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level regardless of the set of control variables we 
use. At a state-month average level of consumption of 8193 millions of 
cubic feet, these results suggest NSO policies cause an increase of 
385–393 million cubic feet per state, per month. With 33 state policies 
in place, at an average coverage length of 5.2 months, NSO policies 
cause a total increase in natural gas consumption of 66–67 billion 
cubic feet per winter season. Given the average retail price of $14.40 
per thousand cubic feet, active NSO policies cause between $950–970 
million dollars annually in increased expense.11 
In specifications with Region * Month/Year effects, shown in 
columns 5–8 of Table 2, the magnitude of our estimates is smaller 
than the two-way fixed effects estimates, but still positive and 
statistically meaningful. These estimates, when controlling for Heating 
Degree Days and a variety of other time-variant factors show that NSO 
policies increase natural gas consumption by between 2.6–3.2%. At a 
state-month average level of consumption of 8193 millions of cubic 
feet, our most conservative results represent an increase of 213–262 
million cubic feet per state, per month for a total increase in natural 
gas consumption of 36–44 billion cubic feet per winter season. The 
smaller magnitude estimates imply an annual increased expense of 
between $530–$650 million dollars. 
To put the magnitude of these estimates in further context, 
consider that the most recent provider survey of natural gas customer 
accounts shows 24% of customers have account balances that are 
past due, but only 4.5% have service disconnected (National 
Regulatory Research Institute, 2005). If average consumption is 
constant across customer account types and there is no behavioral 
response from customers who are not past due or already 
disconnected, our estimates imply that to get to a total increase of 
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between 2.6 and 4.8% (the range of estimates from our results that 
control for Heating Degree Days in Table 2), customers actually 
covered by NSO increase consumption by between 13 and 24.6%. If 
we count current disconnected customers as being affected by the 
policy, our estimates imply that covered customers increase 
consumption by between 10.8 and 20%. 
4.2. Difference-in-difference results 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Eq. (2), or our standard 
difference-in-difference specification. As with the two-way fixed effects 
model, these results rely on the date an NSO policy becomes active 
being exogenous, and uncorrelated with omitted factors that drive 
natural gas usage. The difference between this model and the two-way 
fixed effects models, is that this specification only controls for common 
cross-section characteristics for the grouping of states that have a 
date-based NSO policy rather than for characteristics of individual 
states and only controls for time-variant factors that are common 
among months when policies are active (with the exception of 
estimates that use month-year effects in columns (5) and (10)). 
Table 3. Natural gas consumption and NSO policies: difference-in-
difference estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
NSO 
State 
0.04
0 
0.09
0 
0.100 0.091 0.206 
0.04
6 
0.09
2 
0.101 0.090 0.178 
(0.2
31) 
(0.2
06) 
(0.16
2) 
(0.15
9) 
(0.13
7) 
(0.2
31) 
(0.2
06) 
(0.15
8) 
(0.15
6) 
(0.14
1) 
Month 
Covere
d 
1.01
6*** 
0.44
8*** 
0.290
*** 
0.311
*** 
– 
1.01
1*** 
0.44
8*** 
0.277
*** 
0.304
*** 
– 
(0.0
66) 
(0.1
10) 
(0.09
9) 
(0.09
9) 
 (0.0
65) 
(0.1
11) 
(0.09
9) 
(0.09
9) 
 
NSO 
Active 
0.75
9*** 
0.07
9 
0.193
** 
0.207
** 
0.092 
0.74
7*** 
0.07
7 
0.219
** 
0.237
*** 
0.129
* 
(0.0
73) 
(0.1
21) 
(0.08
7) 
(0.08
6) 
(0.06
4) 
(0.0
74) 
(0.1
22) 
(0.08
4) 
(0.08
4) 
(0.07
2) 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
[Resource and Energy Economics, Vol 48,  (May 2017): pg. 19-29. DOI. This article is © [Elsevier] and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Elsevier] does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from [Elsevier].] 
17 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Heatin
g 
Degree 
Days 
 0.00
1*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
 0.00
1*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
 (0.0
00) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
 (0.0
00) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
Retail 
Price 
  −0.0
96*** 
−0.0
97*** 
−0.1
11*** 
  −0.1
09*** 
−0.1
10*** 
−0.1
11*** 
  (0.02
0) 
(0.02
0) 
(0.02
4) 
  (0.02
2) 
(0.02
2) 
(0.02
4) 
Median 
Incom
e 
(thous
ands) 
   0.007 0.012    0.009 0.012 
   (0.00
8) 
(0.00
9) 
   (0.00
8) 
(0.00
9) 
Year 
Dummi
es 
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-
Year 
Effects 
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
N 
412
8 
412
8 
4128 4128 4128 
412
8 
412
8 
4128 4128 4128 
R-
Square
d 
0.47
6 
0.58
5 
0.681 0.684 0.684 
0.48
0 
0.58
6 
0.697 0.701 0.720 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of 
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita. 
NSO State represents a dummy variable indicating a state that has a 
date-based NSO policy. Month covered represents a dummy variable 
for months when NSO policies are active. NSO Active represents the 
interaction between a state with an NSO policy and a month when the 
policy is active for date-based NSO policies only. Months that are 
partially covered by NSO policies are considered fully covered in the 
data. The unit of observation is a state-month. For results in column 
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(10) a month for each year is omitted from the specificaion due to 
colinearity. Standard errors clustered at State level are shown in 
parentheses. 
** 
p < 0.05. 
* 
p < 0.1. 
The results in Table 3 generally show substantially larger effects 
of NSO policies on natural gas usage than the state fixed-effects 
model. The most conservative estimates, which control for heating 
degree days, but not prices or income, suggest a 7.7–7.9% increase in 
natural gas usage, although these specifications do not produce a 
statistically meaningful result. Across specifications that implement 
control variables, we find the effect of an active NSO policy causes 
between a 19.3 and 23.7% increase in natural gas usage, statistically 
precise at either the five or one-percent level in all specifications, 
except when estimating with month-year effects. 
One explanation for why the difference-in-difference results are 
larger than the state fixed effects results is that there is unobserved 
heterogeneity within the group of states that have NSO policies. This is 
picked up by the state fixed-effects models, but not the difference-in-
difference models because those states are treated as a group. Part of 
this heterogeneity is the difference in NSO policies themselves, as we 
show in Table 1. For this reason, we believe that the state fixed-effects 
models are a more accurate representation of the effect of NSO 
policies on natural gas consumption. Another explanation is that the 
control for only months covered by NSO policies (along with the 
Heating Degree Days variable) are not picking up enough of the 
seasonal variation in natural gas usage that is correlated with when 
policies begin and end in the calendar year. 
4.3. Heterogeneous policy results 
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Tables 4 (two-way fixed effects) and 5 (difference-in-difference) 
show results for estimating Eqs. (3) and (4), which explore how policy 
heterogeneity impacts our results. Exploring how variation in NSO 
policies affects natural gas usage is also of interest because it may 
shed light on how to reduce inefficient consumption, but still offer 
some redistribution to the neediest consumers. One potential method 
for targeting the neediest consumers is to limit the customer group(s) 
they protect. For example, a policy that only covers customers who 
must demonstrate medical or financial need may lead to less 
inefficiency than a policy that prevents shut-offs for all customers. 
Table 4. Natural gas consumption and NSO policy 
heterogeneity: two-way FE estimates. 
 Covers All Need Based Vulnerable 
Payment 
Plan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy 
Type*NSO 
Active 
0.070
*** 
0.041
** 
0.092
*** 
0.057
*** 
−0.00
4 
−0.00
4 
−0.06
2*** 
−0.10
8*** 
(0.02
3) 
(0.02
0) 
(0.01
1) 
(0.00
9) 
(0.01
2) 
(0.01
0) 
(0.01
6) 
(0.01
3) 
Heating 
Degree Days 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
0.001
*** 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
Retail Price 
−0.05
0*** 
−0.03
4*** 
−0.05
2*** 
−0.03
5*** 
−0.04
9*** 
−0.03
4*** 
−0.05
0*** 
−0.03
4*** 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
1) 
Median 
Income 
(thousands) 
−0.00
1 
0.001 
−0.00
1 
0.001 
−0.00
1 
0.001 
−0.00
1 
0.001 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
1) 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Covers All Need Based Vulnerable 
Payment 
Plan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Month-Year 
Effects 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Region × Mont
h × Year 
Effects 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 
R-Squared 0.977 0.988 0.977 0.988 0.977 0.988 0.977 0.988 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of 
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita. 
Covers All are NSO policies that cover the entire population in a state, 
with no pre-qualified characteristics. Need Based indicates a date 
based policy that is active for customers with demonstrated financial 
hardship, unemployment, recipients of government welfare, etc. 
Vulnerable indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
with illness, disability, and/or elderly or very young customers. 
Payment Plan indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
who commit to a payment plan to pay their outstanding bill. NSO 
Active represents the interaction between a state with an NSO policy 
and a month when the policy is active for date-based NSO policies 
only. Months that are partially covered by NSO policies are considered 
fully covered in the data. The unit of observation is a state-month. 
Standard errors clustered at State level are shown in parentheses. 
*** 
p < 0.01. 
** 
p < 0.05. 
Table 5. Natural gas consumption and NSO policy 
heterogeneity: D-i-D estimates. 
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 Covers All Need Based Vulnerable 
Payment 
Plan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy 
Type*N
SO 
State 
−0.15
0*** 
−0.19
2*** 
−0.24
8*** 
−0.30
6*** 
−0.124
*** 
−0.13
2*** 
0.124*
** 
0.132*
* 
(0.054
) 
(0.054
) 
(0.033
) 
(0.033
) 
(0.032) 
(0.032
) 
(0.042
) 
(0.042
) 
Month 
Covered 
0.433*
** 
0.429*
** 
0.382*
** 
0.368*
** 
0.419**
* 
0.416*
** 
0.428*
** 
0.425*
** 
(0.039
) 
(0.039
) 
(0.039
) 
(0.038
) 
(0.038) 
(0.039
) 
(0.038
) 
(0.038
) 
Policy 
Type*N
SO 
Active 
0.249*
* 
0.279*
* 
0.186*
** 
0.215*
** 
0.218**
* 
0.236*
** 
0.047 0.045 
(0.086
) 
(0.085
) 
(0.039
) 
(0.039
) 
(0.046) 
(0.045
) 
(0.058
) 
(0.057
) 
Heating 
Degree 
Days 
0.001*
** 
0.001*
** 
0.001*
** 
0.001*
** 
0.001**
* 
0.001*
** 
0.001*
** 
0.001*
** 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
Retail 
Price 
−0.09
5*** 
−0.10
8*** 
−0.09
5*** 
−0.10
8*** 
−0.094
7*** 
−0.10
8*** 
−0.09
6*** 
−0.10
9*** 
(0.020
) 
(0.022
) 
(0.020
) 
(0.024
) 
(0.021) 
(0.023
) 
(0.020
) 
(0.022
) 
Median 
Income 
(thousa
nds) 
0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.006 
(0.008
) 
(0.008
) 
(0.008
) 
(0.008
) 
(0.007) 
(0.007
) 
(0.008
) 
(0.008
) 
Year 
Dummie
s 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 
R-
Squared 
0.648 0.662 0.653 0.670 0.649 0.663 0.649 0.663 
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The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of 
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita. 
Covers All are NSO policies that cover the entire population in a state, 
with no pre-qualified characteristics. Need Based indicates a date 
based policy that is active for customers with demonstrated financial 
hardship, unemployment, recipients of government welfare, etc. 
Vulnerable indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
with illness, disability, and/or elderly or very young customers. 
Payment Plan indicates a date based policy that is active for customers 
who commit to a payment plan to pay their outstanding bill. NSO State 
represents a dummy variable indicating a state that has a date-based 
NSO policy. Month covered represents a dummy variable for months 
when NSO policies are active. NSO Active represents the interaction 
between a state with an NSO policy and a month when the policy is 
active for date-based NSO policies only. Months that are partially 
covered by NSO policies are considered fully covered in the data. The 
unit of observation is a state-month. Standard errors clustered at 
State level are shown in parentheses. 
** 
p < 0.05. 
Table 4 lends some support to the idea that the heterogeneous 
NSO policies have differential effects on natural gas consumption. 
Columns (1) and (2) show estimates of the impacts of NSO polices 
that cover all customers, regardless of circumstance, on natural gas 
consumption. The magnitude of these results suggests that NSO 
policies covering all customers increase natural gas usage between 4.1 
and 7%, statistically significant at conventional levels. This 
specification uses all other NSO policies as the comparison group, 
indicating state policies that cover all customers induce more natural 
gas usage than other types of NSO policies. Columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 4 show results for date-based NSO policies that also require the 
customer to demonstrate some type of financial need. These results 
show that NSO policies that are need-based (in addition to date-
based) increase natural gas consumption by between 5.7 and 9.2%, 
statistically significant in both specifications. 
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Columns (5)–(8) of Table 4 show results for date based NSO 
policies that only cover the vulnerable populations or those that agree 
to a payment plan, respectively. The results for NSO policies that only 
cover vulnerable populations are essentially zero in magnitude, and 
not statistically significant. The results for NSO policies that only cover 
those that agree to a payment plan are large but negative – 
suggesting that this dimension of the policy could actually work to 
reduce consumption among covered populations relative to other types 
of NSO policies. 
The difference-in-difference results for heterogeneous NSO 
policies are shown in Table 5. The results for policies that cover all 
customers and that are need based remain consistent with the two-
way fixed effects specifications. The effect of a covers all policy is 
larger in the difference-in-difference specification, showing that NSO 
policies that cover all residents increase natural gas consumption 
between 24.9 and 27.9%. 
4.4. Alternative estimation: propensity score matching 
The primary assumption driving both the two-way fixed effects 
and difference-in-difference models is that there are no simultaneous 
changes in areas where NSO policies are active at the time they are 
active. Ultimately, this assumption is not testable as it is always 
possible that unobservable changes are happening. However, if 
unobservables are correlated with observable differences between 
control and treated areas, we can limit the influence of unobservable 
factors by conditioning the sample on observable characteristics. To 
that end we use a variant of the propensity-score model demonstrated 
in Crump et al. (2009), that suggests trimming the estimation sample 
by some value of a propensity score. This procedure first requires 
estimation of the likelihood that a state adopts a date-based NSO 
policy: 
(5) 
Where NSO is a (0,1) indicator at the state level for places that have a 
date based NSO policy. X represents the same control variables used 
in our primary estimation, but averaged to the state level for all 
months of our data. We also include regional dummy variables, σt. We 
use the estimated coefficients from (5) to generate a prediction that 
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each state implements an NSO policy and use this variable to create a 
sub-sample for estimation. Our sub-sample includes all states in the 
top half of the predicted NSO policy distribution, and we use that 
group to re-estimate our primary models. 
Table 6 shows the results for both the two-way fixed effect and 
difference-in-difference models using the propensity score trimmed 
sample. The difference-in-difference estimation produces much larger 
magnitude results, on the order of 30–38% increase in natural gas 
consumption. The two-way fixed effects models produce diverging 
results. The standard two-way fixed effects model produces results 
that are roughly double the magnitude of our primary results, 
statistically significant at the one-percent level (suggesting in increase 
in natural gas consumption between 8.7 and 9.8%). The model that 
uses region specific month-year effects produces a null result that is 
small in magnitude and actually has a negative sign. 
Table 6. Natural gas consumption and NSO policies: matching 
sample estimates. 
 Two Way FE Model D-i-D Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NSO Active 
0.087
*** 
0.098
*** 
−0.0
12 
−0.0
02 
0.308
*** 
0.355
*** 
0.310
*** 
0.382
*** 
(0.01
6) 
(0.01
5) 
(0.01
3) 
(0.01
2) 
(0.06
2) 
(0.05
6) 
(0.06
2) 
(0.05
5) 
Year Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Month-Year 
Effects 
Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Region × Month 
× Year Effects 
No No Yes Yes No No No No 
N 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 
R-Squared 0.979 0.983 
0.99
0 
0.99
2 
0.507 0.593 0.508 0.611 
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Dependent variable is natural log of monthly natural gas 
consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita. Sample includes all 
states with a propensity score above the median value (0.7176) as 
generated from estimates in Eq. (5). Estimates in odd numbered 
columns include controls for Heating Degree Days. Estimates in even 
numbered columns include Heating Degree Days, Retail Price, and 
Median Income. Standard errors clustered at State level in 
parentheses. 
*** 
p < 0.01. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper offers the first examination of the effect of NSO 
policies on natural gas markets and finds that they lead to significantly 
higher consumption levels. Our preferred specifications suggest that 
activation of a NSO policy increases natural gas consumption by 
between 4.7 and 4.8%, resulting in a total increase of between 66 and 
67 billion cubic feet of natural gas consumed per winter season in 
covered states, at a value of as much as $950–970 million annually. 
The magnitude of the results we find suggests consumption increases 
as high as 24.6% among households that are likely to be covered by 
NSO policies. 
Two explanations seem appropriate for our findings. The first, 
and most basic, is that NSO policies work to provide a service to the 
less fortunate that they would otherwise not be able to afford- home 
heating during the winter months. This view would associate the 
consumption increase we find with a transfer of resources, and could 
easily be justified on equity grounds, or on efficiency grounds if there 
is a negative externality caused by poor health outcomes. An 
additional, and possibly alternative explanation, is that NSO policies 
induce moral hazard because they do not require payment for services 
used– effectively making the price zero for a time.12 In this way, NSO 
policies may be leading some customers to consume more gas than is 
necessary for basic comfort.13 In this view, the increase in 
consumption resulting from NSO policies would be inefficient. 
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As our empirical work features only date-based policies as the 
treatment, and control states have temperature or other need-based 
NSO policies, we may be picking up more of the moral hazard induced 
consumption than equity associated consumption. Also, the 
heterogeneous policy effects we find are strongest for policies that 
cover all residents, further supporting the moral hazard explanation, 
although ultimately we cannot definitively distinguish between the two 
in our empirical work. Our work highlights a classic trade-off between 
efficiency and equity in policy design. On the one hand, if the goal of 
the policy is to alleviate human suffering, some NSO policy that 
increases consumption may be justified; however, to the extent that 
these policies lead to moral hazard, it may be worthwhile to re-
examine the details of NSO policies. 
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